This article asks how the EU as a regional organization manages to learn and adapt to policy challenges. It investigates the evolution of one regional level and one national environmental agency (the European Environment Agency and the England and Wales Environment Agency) that have distinct roles in influencing EU environmental policy performance. The article examines the role of agencies and bureaucracies more generally, interrogating some of the assumptions made in the bureaucracy literature, particularly concerning principal-agent models. The focus on agencies helps illuminate two potential dimensions of the EU process: overcoming the original institutional design and the role of organisational and policy learning.
Introduction
Environmental policy, given its interconnection with scientific uncertainty and diverse societal concerns, presents fundamental challenges for political organisations. This reality is doubly problematic given the complex nature of the European Union (EU) policy-making process. Learning approaches to EU integration suggest: (a) how EU actors define both their environmental policy and organisational management problems, and (b) how they formulate philosophies and actions to cope with this complexity.
This article disaggregates the EU system, assuming that the EU's institutional complexity provides numerous potential fora for learning. It takes a meso approach, focusing on two institutions and their evolution: the European Environment Agency The EA is on a completely different scale from the EEA: the largest European environmental agency versus the smallest in terms of staff, the former wielding immense regulatory scope versus the latter's information-centred governance, budgetary resource differences, and the possibilities for intervention by the relatively cohesive British state executive compared to the EU multi-headed hydra (Williams, 2005, 85) . These hugely different agencies facilitate a comparison of the degree they confront similar contextual dynamics and internal impulses.
The next section presents the analytical propositions. The third and fourth sections investigate the EEA and the EA origins, respectively. Both cases ask how the founding negotiations frame the relationship between agency (agent) and principal(s).
The sixth and seventh sections explore respectively the EEA and EA historical evolutions, focusing on their organisational adaptation to their context (organisational learning) and policy learning.
Theoretical Overview

Principal-agent Propositions
Notions of principal-agency have elucidated numerous important EU relationships between bureaucratic organisations (the agents) and the principals, the political authorities (Egan, 1998) . Assuming that bureaucrats manipulate the system to maximise their budget because of their information advantages, principal-agent theorists postulated that politicians/principals anticipate such manipulation and assert their long-term control over their agents by setting various controls (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987) . Further assumptions include: (1) bureaucrats have personal preferences that conflict with the principals' concerns; (2) the delegation of authority to agents gives the bureaucrats information advantages (McCubbins et al., 1987, 246-7) .
Because of the prohibitive costs of monitoring and sanctioning such bureaucratic behaviour, the principals establish control mechanisms (e.g. clearly defined administrative procedures and oversight processes), but do not require specifying or even knowing the detailed policy outcomes (McCubbins et al., 1987, 256-61) .
Agency discretion occurs if the agency manages to engage in opportunistic behaviour, known as 'shirking', that is more costly for the principal (Kassim and Menon, 2003, 122) .
Structural Disagreement
Moe's framework (1984, 773) questioned key principal-agent assumptions (i.e. that the agency possesses no internal conflict and that the principals agree) and the amount of control principals can actually impose. Multiple interests and principals operate in all democratic systems. Moe's structural perspective expects a dominant advocacy coalition consisting of the government and its associated constituencies to build administrative structures insulating their achievements from politics. The opposing coalitions protect their voice in the structural design of the bureaucracies by imposing structures that subvert effective performance and politicise agency decisions (Moe, 1989, 273-7) .
The agency's characteristics are the product of strategic design exercised by politicians and affected interests. Since no singularity of interest exists, the design of the personnel decisions and administrative goals reflect a much more chaotic discussion than the principal-agent approach predicts. No one succeeds in achieving their goals for agency design: opposing coalitions seek to impose structures that inhibit agency performance and enhance external control while the coalition in power defends the agency and even counter-attacks with its own structures (Moe, 1989, 281-5) . The Moe framework expects agencies to face a path dependent situation where the structural choices of the agency's creation endure and dominate over future changes, leading to a largely static and incoherent equilibrium for the agencies.
Historical Institutionalist Propositions
Sharing characteristics of Moe's more rationalist approach, historical institutional perspectives provide an alternative explanation for agency change and stasis. The complex EU institutional process places significant constraints on agency choices, forcing agency adherence to past norms and decisions. Environment agencies also are slow to change and do so incrementally to reflect enshrined norms and rules.
Although institutions resist change in favour of current norms, change is possible without hypothesising learning (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, 18-31) . For example, agencies may keep the basic set of rules and resources but face redirection by newly elected governments, or some grouping of principals, towards a new set of goals and objectives that transforms the agency's role.
Learning propositions
Waterman, Rouse and Wright (2004, 24-46) conceptualise the implications of relaxing two principal-agent assumptions (conflicts over goals are inevitable, and agents have more information than the principals). They argue that the PrincipalAgent model is only one (albeit frequent) scenario (Waterman et al., 2004, 24-31) .
They argue for the possibility of competing principals as well as agencies, and that the principals may sometimes possess considerable knowledge. Neither the principals nor the agents are likely to have unitary outlooks. Agencies have incentives to ally with principals who share their goals/outlooks, and vice versa. Both agencies and other interest groups are motivated strongly to share information with supporting coalitions; consequently the situation of information asymmetry decreases.
Information and learning are core dynamics that can transform the principal-agent relationship as both sets of actors learn gradually about policy and their own organisations (Waterman et al., 2004, 37-42) . Carpenter (2001, 14-35, 353-67) has explored how bureaucracy can build autonomy and establish direct links to the citizens and the new associations. Bureaucracies need stable legitimacy for themselves and their policies, so they push policy innovation (Carpenter, 2001, 14-8) .
Autonomy exists when agencies can make the decisive first moves towards a new policy, establishing an agenda or the most popular alternative, which become too costly for politicians and organised interests to ignore. Principal-agent adherents would define such behaviour as shirking. However, there is a significant possibility that cannot be subsumed in this approach: namely that agencies can transform the preferences or the configuration of the principals (the public, organised interests, and politicians). Agencies operating with discretion may exert bureaucratic entrepreneurship (Carpenter 2001, 30-1) . Here the agency leadership experiments with new programs and introduces innovations to existing programmes while gradually convincing the diverse political coalitions to value the new innovation and the agencies themselves.
Agency actors sustain this preference shift by using recognised legitimacy in the policy area, by building superior ties to the public and/or media, or by establishing reputations for impartiality and dedication to the public good. Agencies operating in the classic principal agency scenario seek to develop advocacy coalition scenarios or even more secure policy subsystem and technocracy relationships where stability, recognition and legitimacy define the agency role. This article articulates the conditions under which agencies deviate from the principal's goals (i.e. shirking) but also those conditions where those goals are transformed (learning processes).
Learning Approaches and Constraints
The special issue's introductory article presents the main learning approaches used here: 'lesson drawing', 'social learning' and 'organisational learning' (see also Bennett and Howlett, 1992) Both involve searching for and using information from outside the organisation and both processes should impact on each other given the environment agencies' policy tasks.
Organisational learning is 'the development of structures and procedures that improve the problem-solving capacity of an organisation and make it better prepared for the future' (Olsen and Peters, cited in Common, 2004, 37) . It is useful to differentiate this focus on how organisations learn and adapt in their organisational setting compared to the concepts of social learning and lesson drawing which focus on the organisation's policy output. The distinction indicates an important yet overlooked learning dimension: how do actors adjust their political strategy? Table One outlines some of the possibilities for agency learning and coalition-building. The table examines agency behaviour in terms of how it seeks to manipulate innovation and the political arena to influence its principal-agent relationship. Situation C involves substantial coalition innovation through endogenous processes although external pressures also may figure. All three forms of learning outlined above may factor in improving agency performance and coping strategies; this may cause shirking from aims set by the principal.
The key difference between this and Situation D is that Situation D encapsulates the process where the learning dynamics (potentially all three types) are harnessed by entrepreneurship. The agency seeks a wider actor coalition to embrace this knowledge and embed it into their own rules and behavioural norms. It is this political and entrepreneurial act of taking the learning outcome, and using it to inform and perhaps transform the wider principal-agent relationship that goes beyond principal-agent conceptions. The act of learning successful entrepreneurial skills in a particular context is likely to constitute organisational learning.
Comparing Environmental Agencies
The EEA Origins
On 17 January 1989, the Commission President Delors mentioned the regional agency idea while addressing the European Parliament (EP). Several MEPs had filed motions for creating an agency in 1987 and 1988 (EP, 1987 . Delors' speech, calling for the establishment of a precursor to a pan-European environment agency, gave the idea crucial momentum (Brown 1995) . This reflected partially a growing awareness that the EC (European Community) environmental policy's continual expansion demanded an equivalent implementation focus.
The EC arena had already recognised the need for high quality environmental data to support policy formulation and monitoring. In 1985, CORINE (Co-ordinating Information on the Environment) began investigating data gathering and coordinating member state environmental data (Bailey, 1997, 148-49) . Nevertheless, the lack of quality EC level data troubled Commission officials who faced producer criticism that Commission environmental proposals lacked a sound scientific basis (Brown, 1995) . The 1988 Rhodes European Council Summit specifically requested better information on the state of the environment, empowering the Commission response (Schout, 1999, 86) .
Although all member states announced basic support for the concept, specific positions quickly diverged. The British government, preferring a data co-ordinator, warned against a new agency receiving regulatory and inspection powers that duplicated other agencies' work (Brown, 1995) . In contrast, the Green and Socialist
MEPs wanted an agency with regulatory teeth. The Environment Commissioner, Ripa di Meana, and other agency supporters campaigned for autonomous status (Majone, 1997) . Although the EP lacked the co-decision power in the 1980s to block the Council agreement, the EP Environment Committee pushed hard to give the EEA power to inspect and monitor member state compliance (Ladeur, 1996) . and others accepted this reality, arguing that any further EEA enhancement should be a future development (Brown, 1995) . This member state position, together with increasing recognition given to subsidiarity, gave a strong impetus to the network governance idea (Schout, 1999) . The EP only accepted this weakening of its initial vision with the provision of a review procedure. This procedure means that the Council must consult the EP before the review of EEA tasks (Bailey, 1997) .
The Council negotiations on the Agency proposal on 28 November achieved many key decisions. The Council split over the Agency' membership: the UK, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands favoured allowing non-EC states to join;
Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain opposed this (Brown, 1995) . The Council debated extensively the decision-making process (unanimity versus qualified majority voting) for locating elements of the EEA network and for deciding the EEA multiannual programme. Finally, the agency location proved problematic: each member country, excepting Luxembourg, wished to be host (Majone, 1997) . The Council deferred this last debate to achieve an agreement. The Council created an Agency charged with providing information and co-ordinating this information through the means of networks (Vos, 2003, 119-20) . This differentiated it from the older EC agencies that lacked the network creation scope:
e.g. the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training. The EEA represented the embodiment of 'network governance': where more decentralised networks replace the 'top-down' mechanisms of governing society associated with the state.
In the EEA's creation, one set of principals, the member states, dominated several key decisions. At one level the EEA is located in a classic principal-agent role with a very constrained role of co-ordinating information (gathered by others) and a network (Ladeur, 1996) . Nevertheless, the differing principals' negotiating positions are reflected in some of the original regulation's ambiguities. The Regulation is unclear about whether the agency can influence directly policy formulation (Majone, 1997) . Moe's approach better explains some of the Regulation's tensions than a strict principal-agent approach. The EEA had a long list of tasks, but the Commission and some Member states particularly underscored the information gathering. The EP wanted the EEA to monitor implementation while certain Member States hoped the EEA could steer EC policy through informational devices (Schout, 1999, 90 ). Moe's notion of a clash of interests also resonates with the three year struggle over the EEA location (Carvel, 1993) . The decision became linked to the location of the other newly formed EC institutions and the EP's continued presence in Strasbourg (European Parliament, 1990, 7-8) . When the Strasbourg site was affirmed and the number of new institutions reached a sufficiently high level for a horse trade, the Danes, keen on the environment agency's symbolic value, secured the EEA.
The EA Origins
In his first Prime Minister's environment speech on 8 July 1991, John Major announced his government's desire for a combined environmental agency (Carter and Lowe, 1995, 38-39 Kingdom, 1990) . Moreover, the proposal clashed with the UK environmental tradition of fragmented, decentralised and informal regulatory administration and behaviour (Carter and Lowe, 1995) .
The agencies involved in environmental regulation and management were quite with social learning shifts occurring in the policy arena. There was an increasing learning process recognising that the absence of a unified administration was leading to the regulation of emissions in one media simply displacing pollution into another media. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution and other actors pushed the integrated pollution control concept, which emphasised the need for rationalising administrative structures (Carter and Lowe, 1995, 41-3) . The creation of the HMIP and the NRA already reflected this, but many sought further steps.
European environmental regulation also was shifting UK environmental structures (national expert interview, 2006). The more informal, piecemeal UK environmental approach had to confront the detailed EC regulatory stipulations (Haigh, 1986) .
Although the various UK agencies, such as the NRA, had developed European divisions and officers, these sections were enmeshed in increasing detail and lacked a strategic perspective on European developments (Ward, Talbot, and Lowe, 1995, 48-9) . This reactive mode meant that the agencies had seldom direct involvement in the various EU specialist committees framing and generating new EC policy.
Commission officials often perceived these UK agencies as having a marginal role while the Whitehall departments controlled the Brussels access.
Furthermore, European actors had difficulty discerning the specific agency roles in the unfamiliar, complex UK system. Agencies such as the NRA lacked an explicitly defined relationship to the EU policy structure; their uniqueness in the European context rendered it difficult to form relationships with European networks (Ward et al., 1995, 49-51) .
Although most actors expressed a superficial support for Major's proposal, within
Whitehall the Department of the Environment (DoE) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) contested the policy control. At stake was the ministerial control over parts of the river authority functions when the NRA lost some of these functions in its Agency transfer (Carter and Lowe, 1995, 38-47) . Consequently the government set a consultation process until January 1992.
Circulated in 1991, the consultation paper offered four options: (1) an agency that absorbed HMIP responsibilities and local authority control over waste regulation but left the separate NRA's water authority; (2) an umbrella body that co-ordinated the separate NRA and HMIP activities; (3) an agency combining the HMIP, NRA and NWA; and (4) an agency combining the three bodies but leaving a partial NRA managing river, water and fisheries (Department of the Environment, 1991).
The Confederation of Business Industry wanted a unified agency centred on the HMIP, with which it had excellent professional relations. Water amenity/industry and rural interests strongly backed a strong NRA. Environmental non-governmental organisations supported a unified agency but worried that amalgamation would damage the strong statutory authority located within the NRA. The Departmental row within Whitehall continued and even extended to disputes concerning overall responsibilities for coastal protection (Carter and Lowe, 1995, 48-9) .
The Conservative Government chose the third solution. The 1995 Environment Act established the EA, an agency covering England and Wales, but not Scotland (United Kingdom, 1995) . The Agency's principal aim was protecting and enhancing the environment, taken as a whole, thus contributing to the global goal of sustainable development (EA, undated). Although sponsored by one Department (the DoE), EA had links to the Welsh Office and to MAFF. Government grants provided 30% of the Agency funding while environmental charges would finance the remainder. The
Agency's work fell into two categories: (1) environmental protection including the regulating of controlled waste management, protecting and improving the quality of various bodies of water and groundwater, regulating major industrial processes; and (2) water management concerning water resource, flood defence, fisheries, recreation, conservation and navigation (United Kingdom, 1995, Section 6; EA, undated).
Underneath these aims was a considerable debate over how to incorporate officials from the diverse government bodies (McMahon, 2006, 146) . A fundamental tension existed in the specific principles that the bodies wanted incorporated into the new agency. The organisational amalgamation reflected the desire to retain the strengths of the three core bodies while also pleasing their separate constituencies. However, this effort devised a rather incoherent administrative structure reflecting these concerns and creating tensions within the new organisation. Moe's framework is very persuasive in this history.
The officials in each of the bodies hoped that the EA would reflect the key organisational principles of their own institution. The NRA, the largest of the three bodies in terms of staffing and budget, wanted the EA organisation to follow 'natural environmental boundaries and particularly river basins' (McMahon, 2006, 147-74) .
The HMIP officials feared that such an approach would create a larger NRA, with the HMIP losing their professional philosophy and their close professional links to business. The WRAs wanted an organisation based on local authority boundaries.
The eventual outcome reflected the organisation of the biggest EA segment-the NRA.
Another critical organisational issue focused on whether the organisation should reflect functional-media divisions or a set of cross-cutting and functionally integrated themes. This suggested the idea of multi-skilled teams that the HMIP, with its integrated pollution control outlook, found the best fit.
The ensuing agency had a small head office, regional managers that set regional strategies and area officials resolving local issues (EA Interviews, 2007) . The
Agency, in incorporate a more integrated approach to regulatory tasks, also added a matrix structure organised around nine over-arching themes; it required regional and area actors to work across the themes. The underlying idea was to inculcate at the more local level different officials with different functional expertise and skills working together as a multi-skilled team. What resulted was an organisational system that, especially below the national level, posed its staff with unfamiliar rules and norms. Consequently, the staff felt that the agency had made inadequate allowance for staff adjustment to the new complex organisation (McMahon, 2006, 147-74) . With the Commission taskforce disbanding in 1994, a small Agency staff of six began a recruiting process that grew the Agency up to 55 staff with a budget of 18.6 million ECUs by 1999 (Caspersen, 1999, 72; House of Lords, 1995) . In order to achieve its three basic aims of networking, monitoring and reporting, the EEA followed a five year Multi-Annual Work Programme. The essential EEA organisation involved a Director's Office, an administrative department, three operational departments, a Management Board and a Scientific Committee. Given the Agency's small size and the Regulation's stipulations, the EEA necessarily embraced becoming a 'new kind of "networking bureaucracy"' (Caspersen, 1999, 72) .
The EEA Evolution
Given the explicit mandate to build a network system using an extant structure, the Another potential controlling device for the principals was the EEA Management Board, which incorporates directly the various principals (member state representatives, Commission officials and EP appointees). While the Board must approve the EEA work programme and various organisational/staffing decisions, this is more a negative form of control rather than ability to manage the EEA's direction.
Furthermore, the Board's increasingly large size (with enlargement) exacerbates these limits. The Board acts as information conduit and network for the EEA and its principals.
The core principal-agent relationships are evolving. The relationship with the DG Environment, the key interlocutor between the Commission and the EEA, has ambiguities given the Commission's role as guardian of the treaties and the location of the EEA budget within the DG Environment Budget. The DG has special control over it and can make proposals. This has nurtured a perception among some DG officials that the EEA takes its money and should do its bidding (EEA interview, 2007; IEEP and EIPA, 2003, 62-3) . A 1990s effort of the EEA leadership to enlist the EP as a counterweight principal to the Commission created further difficulties; it did not transform the generally tepid MEP interest (EP official interview, 2007).
Since 2000, however, both the Commission and the EEA have built a more collaborative relationship despite some continued differences in opinion about the EEA role in policy implementation and effectiveness (IEEP and EIPA, 2003, 42-3) .
This partly reflects a politically more discrete and sensitive EEA approach and relationships to the DG, compared to relations between senior management in the 1990s (EEA and EP official Interviews, 2007; IEEP and EIPA, 2003, 60-62) . Regular The policy role has been integral in the EEA evolution from report writing and maintaining information integrity. In the 1990s, the Director Generals of DG Environment viewed themselves as the chief client and actor responsible for policy; the EEA's main focus should be data collection. The 1998 and 2000 budget discussions triggered a heavy DG push for the EEA to downgrade lower priority tasks (IEEP and EIPA, 2003, 38-40, 61-2) . Nevertheless, the EEA actors understand that data gathering and the provision of environmental information are ambiguous and not a neutral activity. Even mere data organising raises issues of policy problem perception and of how policy works (EEA Interviews, 2007) .
Changing EU policy demands have supported this organisational and instrumental learning (IEEP and EIPA, 2003, 28-9) . Thus the Cardiff process and the Sixth Action programme generated particular policy requests (by the clients/principals) that the Agency could respond to with specific information. Since 1998, the EEA has worked with the Commission and Council Presidency in actual policy development in such areas as the Greenhouse Gas Monitoring Mechanism. EEA staff have presented to the informal Environment Councils (IEEP and EIPA, 2003, 32) .
The EEA has exploited its network agency role to build closer ties with actors inside and outside the EU process. The EEA management have stressed the importance of staff networking, which sometimes challenges EEA officials from highly technical backgrounds. The EEA officials carefully follow the Regulation, which has the ambiguity to allow limited task expansion (EEA Interviews, 2007) . For the EIONET to function properly, the EEA must interact with member state officials, scientific experts, civil society stakeholders and the EU institutions.
EEA officials observe the Regulatory requirement to engage with international organisations without duplicating effort. They engage with third countries and international institutions in order to showcase policy knowledge and networking and data collection ideas, based on EU experience (EEA Interviews, 2007) .
Although the EEA has embedded itself in an extensive policy network and has moved towards policy assessment, this ongoing process can still meet resistance from various quarters. Accordingly EEA officials focus on discrete and restricted aims.
Nevertheless, public criticism can be swift. The EEA made two initial efforts to assess the policy effectiveness of directives (reports on packaging waste implementation and on urban waste water treatment). The waste report encountered substantial industry criticism (Consultant Interview, 2007) . The EEA's careful response to this criticism fits with its broader organisational approach: to remain careful about the data, its analysis and the resulting claims (ENDS, 2005a; ENDS, 2005b) .
The EA Evolution
Since its 1996 creation/amalgamation, much of the EA learning has been internal The recognition that the EA is a competent authority for implementing EU regulations necessitated Agency involvement in discussions concerning new EU measures.
However the policy community recognised that the EA involvement varied significantly depending on the policy area and generally has been relatively reactive and less strategic before 2000 (Consultant interview, 2007) . Gradually the Commission has learned to listen to the Agency and recognise that it has a significant voice distinct from the government (Consultant, EA interviews, 2007) .
This separateness from the principal, the UK government, has been recognised internationally. The Commission finds useful the Agency's evidence-based approach to its argumentation; the EA also pushed the better regulation agenda in EU discussions (EA interviews, 2007) . The EA influenced the EU process that formulated, for example, the general structure and specific (e.g. groundwater)
provisions of the Water Framework Directive (EA official interview, 2007) .
Similarly, the EA has promoted the UK emphasis on risk-based calculations in formulating environmental management, such as the Contaminated Land Directive (EA interview, 2007 
Conclusions
The comparison of these two agencies always must acknowledge their fundamental differences. The EEA is an information and network agency while the EA has strong regulatory powers. Ignoring CORINE, the EEA started from scratch; the EA amalgamated the NRA and other bodies within the UK system.
Nevertheless, interesting similarities appear. Both agencies started as political ideas for limited organisations that were rendered more complicated during negotiations by the widely disparate decisional actors' interests; both histories conform strongly to
Moe's depiction of the structural choices and negotiations that occur at the start of an agency's history. This theoretical explanation dominates the findings as well as the individual histories, posing challenges for the agencies to overcome. The dynamics these initial decisions create accord substantially with the path dependent expectations of the historical institutionalist approach. For example, the EEA has scrupulously followed the dictates of its founding Regulation.
The evolving histories make a substantial if secondary case for learning concepts.
This also may reflect the nature of environmental governance where there is some convergence in an isomorphic sense towards information and informal/formal networking; such processes are occurring in other significant agencies, including the United States Environment Protection Agency (Hoornbeek, 2000) . Political and budgetary constraints also may be forcing agencies down particular paths.
There is strongest evidence for organisational learning and lesson drawing as The question of whether or not the agency-principal relationships reflect the principalagent model requires further systematic study across policy areas. In the historical overviews, key principals have monitored and controlled agency behaviour. The EEA history highlights periodic EEA reviews, the Management Board, and the founding Regulation. DEFRA controlled the policy decisions, the EA budget and EU access.
Both agencies have shown a concerted effort to improve their internal organisation but also to reach out to their specific principals and other actors through networking (organisational learning). This suggests that some expansive coalition building is altering relations. These changes are closer to notions of shirking than actual transformation of the principal-agent relations in both cases.
One dynamic that gives scope to both shirking and the potential for transformation is the reality of multiple principals and multiple agents. Both agencies have to negotiate carefully their relations with other competing agencies and principals. In particular, where institutions are both the competing agent and the principal (i.e. DEFRA and the Commission) this creates a particularly difficult context for the agency to transform.
